This paper aims to answer three questions focused on a crucial notion of Plato’s philosophy, the théia moira. Often translated by “divine help” or “divine dispensation”, the théia moira is a puzzling notion within Plato’s dialogues. This...
moreThis paper aims to answer three questions focused on a crucial notion of Plato’s philosophy, the théia moira. Often translated by “divine help” or “divine dispensation”, the théia moira is a puzzling notion within Plato’s dialogues.
This notion is hard to define because Plato gives it, in his work, different meanings which, at first sight, are not compatible.
On the one hand, in the Ion or in the Phaedrus, the théia moira stands for a way to enhance the regular human nature, or for a divine possession providing its recipients a determined and very specific help. This help is limited in time and solely concerns a very precise topic (like poetry or divination). On the other hand, the théia moira represents an exceptional nature only given to a few people. This case is clearly typified in the Republic (492e-493a) in which the philosophers-kings, who are supposed to instantiate Plato’s political project, are beneficiaries of the théia moira.
What is common between a limited help supposed to enhance people regular nature for a limited time and on a determined topic, and a divine power giving to certain persons a special and exceptional nature?
A way to answer this question is to examine what has influenced Plato’s thought. I suppose that this problematic diversity is maybe related to the fact that other thinkers have influenced Plato when he has elaborated his own conception of the théia moira.
One of these sources is easy to identify: it could be Socrates himself. In the Apology (33bc), Socrates claims that his demonic and peculiar nature is related to the théia moira. A similar situation appears in Phaedo 58e-59a, in which Socrates declares that he is going to Hades with a divine privilege, ie. a théia moira. In this sense, there is maybe a Socratic conception of the théia moira which has influenced Plato.
This first hypothesis about a possible Socratic influence seems to be confirmed within Aeschines of Sphettus’ fragments. Aeschines of Sphettus was part of the Socratic circle and is mentioned two times within Plato’s dialogues (Phaedo 59b, Apology 33e). There are several occurrences of “théia moira” in these fragments, especially in the fragment 11 (according to Dittmar’s edition). In this fragment, the idea of théia moira is opposed to the idea of techne in order to qualify Socrates’ actions. This opposition is not original, since it also occurs in the Ion (534bc, 536cd, 542a) and is used to point out the specificity of the poetic activity, which is not related to a technè, but which depends on a théia moira.
This last fact seems to indicate that there would be a link between Socrates (as historic character and thinker), Aeschines of Sphettus and Plato himself concerning the notion of théia moira. That’s why, as guideline for my paper, I would ask the following questions I was referring to at the beginning of this abstract:
- What is the conception of the théia moira developed within Aeschines of Sphettos fragments?
- Is Aeschines of Sphettos’ testimony able to give us sufficient informations about a specific Socratic conception of the théia moira?
- In what extend is there a Socratic influence on Plato concerning the théia moira?
To answer these questions, I will expose my argumentation according to three steps. First, I will present how Aeschines of Sphettos has conceived the théia moira. Then, I will try to determine in what extend Aeschines of Sphettos testifies of a Socratic conception of the théia moira. Eventually, I will try to determine the Socratic part within Plato’s conception of the théia moira.
